This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where "sd" stands for first-order stochastic dominance).
Introduction
A wide range of real-life resource allocation problems -student placement in public schools, organ transplantation through live or deceased donors, on-campus housing allocation, and course allocation at business schools -involves the assignment of indivisible objects without the use of monetary transfers.
Most of these markets rely on ordinal mechanisms, where participants reveal only their preference rankings over given choices to the central authority rather than their cardinal preferences. Ensuring fairness of a deterministic allocation can entail significant inefficiencies.
1 Therefore, it has become commonplace to use random mechanisms -which allow the allocation of divisible probabilities -in order to achieve fairness ex ante.
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In spite of this use of randomization, most such markets rely on ordinal mechanisms: participants reveal only their preferences over objects, rather than their preferences over random allocations of objects.
However, from an agent's ordinal ranking i over the set A of objects (assumed strict), one can define first-order stochastic dominance (f.o.s.d.), which is a partial order ≥ i over the set of random allocations (probability measures on A). These partial orders can be used to evaluate random mechanisms. Using the prefix "sd-" to indicate f.o.s.d., we say that a random assignment P is sd-efficient if it is Pareto efficient with respect to the f.o.s.d. orderings. We say that it is sd-envy-free if P i ≥ i P j for all i, j. Then:
• sd-efficiency is stronger than ex-post efficiency, though not as strong as ex-ante efficiency would be if one had access to the complete von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities;
• sd-envy-freeness is weaker than ex-post envy-freeness, though not as weak as ex-ante envy-freeness would be with the vNM utilities.
A common mechanism used in practices is the random serial dictatorship (RSD). Agents are randomly ordered (with a uniform distribution over permutations), and then, in the realized order, agents successively pick their favorite objects from the available ones. However, in spite of the apparent equal treatment of agents, the resulting random assignment may not be sd-envy-free; nor need it be sd-efficient.
In a seminal paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) (BM hereafter) proposed the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS), which is sd-efficient and sd-envy-free. The outcome of PS is defined by the simultaneous eating algorithm (SEA): Consider each object as a continuum of probability shares. Agents simultaneously 1 See, for example, Kesten and Yazici (2012) . 2 For example, the assignment mechanisms used in the context of student placement operate through a collection of strict priority orders of schools over students. In practice, determining these orders often involves randomization Erdil and Ergin, 2008; Kesten andÜnver, 2010; Pathak and Sethuraman, 2011) . Similarly, in the exchange of live-donor kidneys among kidney patients for transplantation, the egalitarian approach requires the design of a random mechanism (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver, 2005) .
"eat away" from their favorite objects at the same speed; once an agent's favorite object is gone, he turns to his next favorite object, and so on. The amount of an object eaten away by an agent throughout the process is interpreted as the probability with which he is assigned this object by PS.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide two axiomatizations of PS. Our first axiomatization is built around a new property, ordinal fairness. Fix a random assignment and, for any agent i and each a ∈ A, let F i (a) be the probability that i obtains a or an object better than a; this is called i's surplus at a.
The random assignment is ordinally fair if for all i, j and a ∈ A such that j obtains a with a positive probability, i's surplus at a is as large as j's surplus at a.
Though related in spirit, ordinal fairness and sd-envy-freeness are quite different, as we illustrate with this example. Suppose there are 2 agents, i = 1, 2, and 2 objects, A = {a, b}. Agent 1 prefers a to b; agent 2 prefers b to a. Suppose we give each object to each agent with an equal probability. Agent 1 does not wish he had agent 2's random allocation. Yet he might envy the fact that agent 2 always gets an object that she likes at least as much as a, whereas this happens to agent 1 only half of the time. The allocation is not ordinally fair.
In this example, the random assignment is not sd-efficient. The only sd-efficient allocation gives a to agent 1 for sure and b to agent 2 for sure; but then ordinal fairness obtains. This suggests a link between ordinal fairness and both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. In fact, we show that ordinal fairness implies both of these properties in the BM setting in which the total supply of objects exactly equals the number of agents. Furthermore, it provides a full characterization of PS in the same setting. (This is the first redefinition of an algorithmic matching mechanism, that we are aware of, through a single tight property.)
In the more general setting when the total supply of objects exceeds the number of agents, it characterizes PS when combined with a mild assumption called non-wastefulness (Theorem 1).
We obtain a second characterization of PS using sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. These are implied by PS but do not fully characterize it. Our Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 show that a complete characterization is obtained by adding either weak invariance or weak truncation robustness; these axioms impose invariance of the assignment to certain perturbations of the ordinal preferences.
Related Literature
There are very few papers that discuss the random assignment problem prior to the new millennium. The earliest account of the problem is due to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , who proposed a pseudo-market mechanism that relies on cardinal preferences of agents. Much later, Zhou (1990) proved an important impossibility result for the cardinal domain: There exists no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and symmetric mechanism. A similar negative result was obtained by Chambers (2004) in the ordinal domain: all ex-post consistent, symmetric, and strategy-proof mechanisms should coincide with uniformly random assignment of objects.
Following the seminal work of BM that introduced PS, the literature on the random assignment problem has grown rapidly. Contrary to the early literature, the new strand of literature often restricts attention to the case when agents' preferences are ordinal.
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PS was initially proposed by Crès and Moulin (2001) for a simple model where agents have the same rankings over objects. A characterization for this special context is given by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) . Kojima and Manea (2010) show that PS recovers strategy-proofness when the market size becomes sufficiently large. Manea (2009) shows that ordinal inefficiency of RSD prevails even for large assignment problems. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) extend PS to the domain of weak preferences. Yılmaz (2009 Yılmaz ( , 2010 adapts it to environments where there may be initial property rights over some of the objects. Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2007) further extend this model and the mechanism to the case with probabilistic endowments. Kojima (2009) offers a generalization of PS to multiple assignment problems. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) have shown that RSD is equivalent to a core mechanism that uniformly randomly selects an initial assignment of objects and then utilizes Gale's celebrated top trading cycles (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) procedure. Sönmez andÜnver (2005), Sethuraman (2011), and Carroll (2010) extend this result to different random matching domains. Kesten (2009) shows a similar connection between PS and the top trading cycles procedure: PS is equivalent to a particular top trading cycles mechanism that initially endows each agent with an equal share of each object. He also provides a "replicated" RSD mechanism that becomes equivalent to PS in the limit. Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2011) characterize the constraints on a random assignment that can also be satisfied by each of the deterministic assignments in the support of a lottery inducing it.
The compelling notion of sd-efficiency has also been the focus of other related papers. offer a characterization of ordinally efficient random assignments. McLennan (2002) proves an interesting result on the relationship between sd-efficiency and ex-ante efficiency. Manea (2008) provides a constructive proof of this result.
The axiomatic characterization of PS for unrestricted preference domains has been begun by three independent studies: Hashimoto and Hirata (2011) (hereafter, HH), Heo (2010) , and Kesten, Kurino, and Unver (2010) (hereafter, KKÜ). KKÜ is the paper that originally presents Theorem 1 of this paper, and 4 Three common justifications for the ordinal approach are as follows: First, since agents are boundedly rational, cardinal preferences are difficult to elicit. Second, ordinal mechanisms are relatively simpler and more practical than cardinal ones.
Third, real-life matching markets function mostly through elicitation of ordinal preferences.
is the first paper that characterizes PS in the general case using sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. HH characterizes the mechanism with these axioms in the environment where the null object always exists.
It also provides an axiomatization based on the Rawlsian principle. Heo (2010) considers an environment where agents may demand multiple units and shows that the generalized PS mechanism is characterized by sd-efficiency, proportional division lower-bound, and several auxiliary axioms.
In a more recent work, Bogomolnaia and Heo (2012) Most notably, whereas all the previously considered invariance conditions mentioned above require that whenever the preferences of an agent change with reference to a fixed object in a specific way, all agents' probability shares of the particular object remain the same, weak invariance makes a much less demanding requirement: only the particular agent's probability share of the particular object should remain the same.
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On the other hand, Liu and Pycia (2011) look at large markets in which all types of agents are represented. They show that, in this case, there is a unique mechanism that is sd-efficient and sd-envyfree and that, in the limit of large markets, uniformly random versions of many known deterministic mechanisms such as serial dictatorships, hierarchical exchange rules (Pápai, 2000) , and trading cycles mechanisms (Pycia andÜnver, 2009 ) coincide with this unique mechanism.
5 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we weaken HH's definition of truncation robustness to the current definition (Definition 3). Upon showing that this new definition is strong enough to characterize PS, we observed that the proof also extends to the general case where the null object may not exist. This motivated us to obtain our second characterization result using the current definition of weak invariance (Definition 2), which is the counterpart of Definition 3 in environments without the null object. 6 Also, our proof immediately implies that we can weaken sd-efficiency in Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 as in HH and BH. 7 A more recent paper by Heo and Yılmaz (2012) 
Model
Our object of study is a discrete resource allocation problem (cf. Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Shapley and Scarf, 1974) . Let N be the finite set {1, ..., n} of agents to whom objects are allocated. In BM, there are exactly n distinct objects to be allocated, one per agent. We generalize this slightly: each agent still receives one object, but the pool of objects to be distributed can include duplicates, that is, objects that are equivalent for all the agents. We let A denote the set of types of objects and, for a ∈ A, let q a denote the quota or supply of object a. There may be a surplus of objects: a∈A q a ≥ |N |.
An assignment specifies an object for each agent such that, for each a ∈ A, the number of agents receiving object a does not exceed q a . Let A refer to the set of possible assignments. We assume objects can be allocated randomly. A lottery is a probability distribution over assignments. Each agent i ∈ N cares only about his own random allocation, that is, the resulting probability distribution
over A, where p i,a is the probability with which he receives object a. We refer to the matrix P = [P i ] i∈N of random allocations, where each row P i is the random allocation of an agent and each column P a allocates probability shares of an object a to the agents, as a random assignment; it has the property that i∈N p i,a ≤ q a for each a ∈ A and a∈A p i,a = 1 for i ∈ N . Let R refer to the set of possible random assignments. Each lottery induces such a random assignment, and each such random assignment is induced by some lottery (cf. Birkhoff, 1946; von Neumann, 1953) . Therefore, we can focus our attention on random assignments as the outcome of a mechanism.
We require that a mechanism elicits only each agent i's ordinal preference relation i over objects.
This preference ordering is assumed to be strict. Although we implicitly allow for some indifference by letting there be duplicates of each object, any indifference must be shared by all agents. Let P be the set of such strict preferences. We sometimes represent i by the ordered list of objects; e.g., i = (b, c, a) or i = (bca) means that b i c i a (here assuming that A = {a, b, c}).
Although agents' preferences over random allocations are unspecified, we can construct a partial order that can be used to compare random allocations based on (first-order) stochastic dominance. Given a ∈ A and i ∈ P for agent i, let U ( i , a) = {b ∈ A | b i a} be the upper contour set of object a at i .
Given a random allocation
be the probability that i is assigned an object at least as good as a under P i ; we simply refer to it as i's surplus at a under P i . For agent i,
given ∈ P N , and P, R ∈ R, P i stochastically dominates
Throughout the paper, whenever it is not ambiguous, we shall suppress N , A, q and denote an allocation problem by a preference profile. Formally, a mechanism is a systematic way of finding a random assignment for a given problem, that is, it is an allocation rule φ : P N →R.
Our model is general enough to contain various interesting special cases:
(1) Unacceptable objects: There is a specific object referred to as the null object and assigned a quota of at least |N |. By interpretation, agents who are assigned the null object are viewed as taking their outside options, or, using the matching jargon, they remain unassigned. The objects ranked below the null object are called unacceptable. This case models assignment under voluntary participation.
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(2) Perfect supply with unit quotas: Each object has a quota of 1 and there are exactly |N | objects.
This is the original setting of BM.
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Three properties of random assignments will be essential in our characterizations. A random assignment is sd-efficient if it is not stochastically dominated by another random assignment.
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Next is a much weaker efficiency property. A random assignment is non-wasteful if the surplus of no agent at any object can be raised through the use of an unassigned probability share of some object.
Formally, given ∈ P N , P ∈ R is non-wasteful at if for all i ∈ N and all a ∈ A such that p i,a > 0, we
Our first fairness property is a fundamental principle in mechanism design theory originally proposed by Foley (1967) . A random assignment is sd-envy-free if each agent, regardless of his vNM utilities, prefers his random allocation to that of any other agent. Formally, given ∈ P N , P ∈ R is sd-envy-free at if for all i ∈ N , P i stochastically dominates P j for all j ∈ N at i .
A mechanism is said to satisfy a property if its outcome, for any problem, satisfies that property.
Two New Axioms
Our second fairness property, essential to our first characterization, is a natural and intuitive axiom for the random assignment setting. A random assignment is ordinally fair if whenever an agent is assigned some object with positive probability, his surplus at this object is no greater than that of any other agent at the same object. It follows that whenever an agent is assigned some object x with zero probability, he must be assigned a better object (for him) with a probability no less than any agent who is assigned object x with positive probability.
9 In this setting, the standard individual rationality requirement, i.e., that no agent be assigned an unacceptable object with some positive probability, is implied by either efficiency property to be subsequently introduced; namely, by either non-wastefulness or sd-efficiency. 10 In this setting, one of our properties, non-wastefulness, to be subsequently introduced, is satisfied vacuously. 11 Equivalently, under any alternative random assignment the surplus of some agent at some object is smaller than that under the original assignment.
Definition 1. Given ∈ P N , P ∈ R is ordinally fair at if for all a ∈ A and all i, j ∈ N with p i,a > 0,
One interpretation of the problem we're studying here is to entitle each agent to an equal probability share of each object initially. Under such an interpretation, ordinal fairness makes it possible for agents to efficiently redistribute their initial shares among themselves so that every agent can enjoy a higher objectspecific surplus, provided that this surplus does not exceed that of another agent. In this sense, ordinal fairness can be viewed as an analogue for the current setup of Varian's fairness notion, which encompasses
Pareto efficiency and envy-freeness in exchange economies with perfectly divisible goods (cf. Varian, 1974 Varian, , 1975 Varian, , 1976 . Remarkably, ordinal fairness implies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness, and it is implied by these two properties in conjunction with a weak technical property when the total supply of objects is equal to the number of agents.
We next introduce an auxiliary robustness axiom, weak invariance, essential to our second characterization. Given −i , the axiom requires that the probability of agent i getting object a depends only on i's preference ranking down to a. When the null object is available, we can interpret weak invariance as robustness against truncations, which are practically important manipulations. We will formalize this interpretation in Section 6. Let i | B be the restriction of i ∈ P to B ⊆ A; that is, i | B is a preference
Definition 2. A mechanism φ is weakly invariant if for all ∈ P N , i ∈ N , a ∈ A and i ∈ P,
.
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Most mechanisms studied in the literature are weakly invariant. Examples include PS, the agentproposing deferred acceptance mechanism, the Boston mechanism, and hierarchical exchange rules (Pápai, 2000) , which include serial dictatorship and the top trading cycles mechanism as special cases. 13 RSD is also weakly invariant since it is a convex combination of weakly invariant mechanisms.
Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
BM introduced the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS), the outcome of which can be computed via the following simultaneous eating algorithm (SEA):
Given a problem , think of each object a as an infinitely divisible good with supply q a that agents eat in the time interval [0, 1] .
12 This property is weaker than both the upper invariance condition of KKÜ and the bounded invariance condition of BH.
13 The "object-proposing" deferred acceptance mechanism, however, violates weak invariance. This is because agents may benefit from truncation (see, e.g., Example 2 of Roth and Rothblum, 1999) , which is not possible under a weakly invariant mechanism.
Step 1: Each agent eats away from his favorite object at the same unit speed. Proceed to the next step when an object is completely exhausted. . . .
Step s, for s ∈ {2, . . . , S}: Each agent eats away from his remaining favorite object at the same speed.
Proceed to the next step when an object is completely exhausted.
The procedure terminates after S ≤ |N | steps when each agent has eaten exactly 1 total unit of objects (i.e., at time 1). The random allocation of an agent i by PS is then given by the amount of each object he has eaten until the algorithm terminates. Let P S( ) ∈ R denote the outcome of PS for problem .
First Characterization of Probabilistic Serial
In our first result, we establish that for each problem there is a unique ordinally fair and non-wasteful random assignment and that this random assignment is the outcome of SEA. In other words, PS fully characterizes ordinal fairness with non-wastefulness, and vice versa.
Theorem 1. A mechanism is ordinally fair and non-wasteful if and only if it is PS.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix ∈ P N . We will drop from all arguments below. We reinterpret the SEA such that at each step at most one object is fully exhausted: If two objects a, b are exhausted in a step according to the original definition, we will order these objects arbitrarily and say that one is exhausted first and the other one is exhausted in the next step. We redefine step S as the first step when each agent has eaten exactly 1 total unit of objects. Let h 1 , ..., h S−1 denote the objects exhausted in steps 1 to S − 1 and the remaining ones be arbitrarily ordered as h S , ..., h |A| .
(⇐) PS is non-wasteful as it is sd-efficient. We show that PS is ordinally fair. First, consider s < S:
Each agent has eaten away weakly better objects than h s until s at the same speed. Thus, for any i ∈ N who eats away h s at s and any j ∈ N who eats away some b j j h s , since they continue eating at the same speed and b j is not exhausted before h s , we have
Next, consider s ≥ S: At step S, each j ∈ N eats away some b j j h s . When SEA terminates after S, j's surplus at b j is 1, and hence, F ( j , h s , P S j ) = 1. Thus, in either case ordinal fairness is satisfied for h s .
(⇒) Let P ∈ R be ordinally fair and non-wasteful at the fixed . We will show that P S= P. Define π(a) = min i F ( i , a, P i ) for all a ∈ A. Relabel objects as a 1 , ..., a |A| so that π(a s ) ≤ π(a s+1 ) for all
.., a s }, and let A s = A \ A s be the set complement of A s . For all s ≥ 1 and all a ∈ A s−1 , let N s (a) = {k ∈ N | a k b for all b ∈ A s−1 }.
SEA for t < S.
Each statement in the inductive assumption holds vacuously for s = 1. We prove that they also hold for step s and thus P = P S :
Step 1.
We show that for all k ∈ N s (a s ), p k,a s = 0: For a contradiction, suppose for some
where the last inequality follows from the ordering of a s before b through π.
However, this inequality violates ordinal fairness of P .
Step 2.
by the definition of π(a s ). Next, suppose t * > 1. Then i ∈ N t * −1 (a t * −1 ). By the inductive assumption
Thus, as a s is ranked just below a t * −1 in i and p i,a s = 0,
Step 3.
We show that at step s of SEA for s < S, for any agent
By the inductive assumption, for each b ∈ A s−1 , at the end of step s − 1 of SEA, the amount that each Step 2 and the definition of π, implies
Thus, the remaining amount of object b is sufficiently large for each agent in N s (b) so that when each agent in N s (a s ) has eaten away π(a s ) − x of a s , no agent in N s (b) has yet started eating an object different from b. Therefore, each j ∈ N s (a s ) eats away by the end of step s at least (π(a s ) − x) + x = π(a s ), the total amount from objects in U ( j , a s ),
Step 4.
for s < S: Proving the first claim is sufficient (by Step 3). Suppose, to the contrary, for some i ∈ N s (a s ), Step 5. We show that the rest of the inductive claim holds for s ≥ S: SEA terminates at step S when each agent has eaten exactly 1 total unit of objects. Any agent i ∈ N S (a) eats away a ∈ A S−1 at step S of SEA. Thus, F ( i , a, P S i ) = 1 and for any k ∈ N S (a), P S i,a = 0. By non-wastefulness of P (through the same argument in
Step 4 applied to a instead of a s ), for any i ∈ N s (a),
Remarkably, ordinal fairness turns out to be a very powerful axiom as it can exclusively characterize PS. Therefore, Theorem 1 offers a new perspective on this mechanism for an appealing domain of problems that subsumes the original BM setting. Consider problems in which the total supply of real objects is less than or equal to the number of agents and all objects are acceptable. In this case, all random assignments are non-wasteful. Hence, a random assignment is ordinally fair if and only if it is the PS outcome.
Corollary 1. In an environment in which all objects are acceptable and the total quota of the objects does not exceed the number of agents, a mechanism is ordinally fair if and only if it is PS.
This result is important as it shows that ordinal fairness offers a non-algorithmic definition of PS.
In the matching literature, almost all mechanisms are defined through algorithmic procedures that have useful properties. This is in contrast to some well-known mechanisms in other contexts such as the Walrasian market mechanism, whose conceptual definition preceded any of its algorithmic (or fixed-point)
constructions. As far as we are aware, ours is the first "redefinition" of a matching mechanism based on a single property.
Second Characterization of Probabilistic Serial
Sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness are among the most appealing properties of mechanisms. Our second result characterizes PS through these two fundamental properties together with a mild robustness condition.
Theorem 2. A mechanism is sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weakly invariant if and only if it is PS.
14 Before giving a formal proof of Theorem 2, we provide in the next example an illustration of our proof strategy for the necessity part. Although the actual proof is more subtle, much of the intuition behind the proof can be grasped from the following simple example.
Example 1. Suppose that there are three agents N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects A = {a, b, c} each with unit quota. Consider preferences = ((abc), (abc), (bca)) and * 3 = (bac). Then the PS outcomes for and ( * 3 , −3 ) are given as: This follows from the SEA as follows: Agents 1 and 2 initially start eating a and agent 3 starts eating b under either profile. At time τ = 1/2 object a is fully consumed giving 1/2 share of a to agents 1 and 2; thus, all agents continue with b. At this point only 1/2 of b is available, and this remainder is equally shared among the three agents giving 1/2 + 1/6 = 2/3 share of b to agent 3 and 1/6 share of b to agents 1 and 2. Finally, in the remaining time each agent consumes 1/3 of c.
We demonstrate that if a mechanism φ is sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weakly invariant, then φ( ) = P S( ). We show this for each object following the order in which objects are exhausted in SEA. In this example, for both and ( * 3 , −3 ), object a is first exhausted at time 1/2, object b is second at time 2/3, and then object c is third at time 1. That is, we show φ a ( ) = P S a ( ) first and then φ b ( ) = P S b ( ).
Note that in this case, φ c ( ) = P S c ( ) immediately follows from those two equalities and the feasibility constraint of random assignments.
Let P = φ( ). First, consider P a . By sd-efficiency, p 3,a = 0. Then, sd-envy-freeness (and nonwastefulness) implies p 1,a = p 2,a = 1/2. Next, we examine the assignment of object b, where we invoke weak invariance in addition to sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. To determine P b , consider P * = φ( * 3 , −3 ). For agents 1 and 3 not to envy each other at * , we need p *
3,b must also hold. Further, by a similar argument to the case of P a , it is easy to see P * a = (1/2, 1/2, 0). Hence, P * b = (1/6, 1/6, 2/3). Then, by weak invariance, p 3,b = p * 3,b = 2/3. Finally, by sd-envy-freeness at , we have p 1,b = p 2,b = 1/6, i.e., P b = P S b ( ) as claimed. ♦ 14 The sd-efficiency requirement in Theorem 2 can be weakened to the following condition (2-sd-efficiency): For all ∈ P N , there exists no P = φ( ) such that P stochastically dominates φ( ) at and |{i ∈ N | P i = φ i ( )}| ≤ 2. See HH for more on this point.
To prove the necessity part of Theorem 2, we first order objects according to the time they are exhausted in SEA. Then, we argue by induction on this order that an sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weakly invariant mechanism φ assigns each agent each object with exactly the same probability as PS. As we did above, we manipulate the preferences such that the order in which objects are exhausted in SEA is unaffected while sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness have enough bite to pin down the assignment probabilities under φ.
The above example is simple enough that we needed to manipulate only one agent's preferences focusing only on one object. However, for the proof to apply in general, one needs to iteratively consider several agents and several objects. Therefore, our general proof warrants careful and tedious construction of new preference profiles while keeping track of assignment probabilities.
Before the proof, we introduce some useful notation. For each ∈ P N and a ∈ A, let τ (a) = min j∈N F ( j , a, P S j ( )). If object a is exhausted in SEA under , τ (a) represents the time when it is exhausted. If it is not exhausted, τ (a) is set to 1. Now, fix a complete strict order on A independent of , and relabel the objects as
Proof of Theorem 2. (⇐) PS is sd-efficient and sd-envy-free. It thus suffices to show that PS is weakly invariant. Let ∈ P N , i ∈ N , i ∈ P, and a * ∈ A, and assume
, SEA under ( i , −i ) works in exactly the same way as under . If τ = 1, this implies P S( ) = P S( i , −i ). If τ < 1, any a ∈ U ( i , a * ) is exhausted by time τ under ( i , −i ) as well as under . Therefore, P S i,a ( i , −i ) = P S i,a ( ) for all a ∈ U ( i , a * ).
(⇒) Suppose that φ is sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weakly invariant. We prove by induction on
It is obvious for s = 0, as A s ( ) = ∅.
Fix s ≥ 1. Assume as our inductive assumption that for all ∈ P N , φ( )| A s−1 ( ) = P S( )| A s−1 ( ) .
It suffices to prove from the inductive assumption that for all ∈ P N and i ∈ N , φ i,a s ( ) ( ) = P S i,a s ( ) ( ). Fix arbitrary ∈ P N . We have two cases, depending on whether or not a s ( ) is exhausted in SEA under .
If a s ( ) is not fully exhausted, P S( ) is the only assignment that satisfies the inductive assumption and non-wastefulness, hence φ( ) = P S( ).
On the other hand, if a s ( ) is fully exhausted in SEA under , to prove the inductive hypothesis at s, it suffices to show that
This claim follows from the following reasoning. Recall that i∈N P S i,a s ( ) ( ) = q a s ( ) as a s ( ) is exhausted under SEA. Therefore, Inequality (1) implies that for all i ∈ N , φ i,a s ( ) ( ) = P S i,a s ( ) ( ), for otherwise the feasibility constraint i∈N φ i,a s ( ) ( ) ≤ q a s ( ) is violated.
Our strategy to show Inequality (1) is as follows. We construct a sequence of preference profiles 0 , . . . , T (where T will be defined later) and show that φ( T ) is wasteful if (1) does not hold, which in turn leads to a contradiction.
First, we introduce some more notation. For any ∈ P N , let a * i ( ) be i's favorite object in A s−1 ( ); i.e., a * i ( ) i b for all b ∈ A s−1 ( ). Also, let
Observe that by the definition of SEA, for all i ∈ N ,
Define Q i as the set of i ∈ P such that (i)
. That is, it is the set of preference relations whose rankings coincide with i down to a *
Proof of Claim 1. Note that SEA under works in exactly the same way as under until time τ = τ (a s ( )). This implies parts (1) and (2). Also, A s−1 ( ) = A s−1 ( ) and P S( )| A s−1 ( ) = P S( )| A s−1 ( ) .
By the inductive assumption, φ( )| A s−1 ( ) = P S( )| A s−1 ( ) and φ( )| A s−1 ( ) = P S( )| A s−1 ( ) . These imply part (3). Note that a * i ( ) i a r ( ) implies P S i,a r ( ) ( ) = 0 by the definition of a r (·) and part (1).
Thus, part (4) is a special case of part (3).
By Claim 1, the variables a 1 (·), . . . , a s (·), a * i (·), and A 1 (·), . . . , A s (·) remain constant on Q N . As we will modify the original preference profile only within Q N , we omit the arguments of these variables for simplicity. Also, N s (a, ) remains constant for all ∈ Q N , so we simply write N s (a).
We order the elements of B as follows: For each b ∈ B, define
for all
This term represents the hypothetical maximum time for object b to be exhausted in SEA, which is the case if no agent i ∈ N s (b) ever eats b and each agent i ∈ N s (b) continues eating b even after time 1. Then, we order the elements of B as
Next, we construct a sequence { t } |B| t=0 in Q N . For each t ∈ {1, . . . , |B|}, let
Set 0 = and let t = ( * M t , −M t ) for each t ≥ 1, where * i ∈ Q i is defined as follows:
It is important in this construction that for each i and t = 0, ..., |B|, there exists a i,t ∈ A such that
, and in particular, if also i ∈ M t we have a * i ∈ B t , and hence,
We show that if Inequality (1) does not hold, then
where
To this end, we prove some auxiliary results (Claims 2-7). We say that b ∈ B is undersupplied to
, where the latter equality follows from Equation (2).
Claim 2. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, where T is defined in Equation (4), if b t is undersupplied to some agent
Proof of Claim 2. To begin, note that for any
). This is simply because φ and P S
15 By the definition of a s and the assumption that a s is fully exhausted in SEA, the entire probability share of a s is exhausted by the agents in N s (a s ) during SEA under , i.e., τ max (a
, which contradicts the definition of a s . Thus, a s ∈ arg min b∈B τ max (b). 16 For each ∈ Q N and N ⊆ N , we write N = ( i ) i∈N and −N = ( i ) i∈N \N . If is written as ( N , −N ), then is such that i = i if i ∈ N and i = i otherwise. 17 Recall that we associate a vector (c 1 , . . . , c n ) with the preference relation i such that 
Third, by the assumption that b t is undersupplied to i,
, where the first equality follows from part (4) of Claim 1 and the second equality follows from Equation (2). Combining these three inequalities, we obtain
by repeatedly applying the above two arguments so that b t is undersupplied to any
). This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 3. For all t ∈ {0, . . . , |B| − 1},
Proof of Claim 3. We argue by induction on t. For t = 0, as b 1 = a s and 0 = , we have
for all u by the definition of a s . Fix t ∈ {1, ..., |B|}. Assume the claim is true for t − 1 as our inductive assumption. By the definition of t , SEA under t works in exactly the same way as under
exhausted before time τ * under t−1 (and hence under t ), for otherwise the claim does not hold for t − 1 contrary to the inductive assumption. Therefore,
for all u ∈ {t + 2, ..., |B|}. Suppose by contradiction that τ t (b u ) < τ t (b t+1 ) for some u > t + 1. Without loss of generality, suppose b u ∈ arg min b∈B\B t τ t (b). Then, it follows from the description of SEA that b u is eaten away only by the agents in
where τ max (·) is given by Equation (3). However, 
which is a contradiction.
Claim 4. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , |B|} and i ∈ M t , F (
Claim 8. Suppose that a s is undersupplied to some agent in N s (a s ) at . Then, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T },
where T is defined as in Equation (4).
Therefore, it follows from (5) and (6) 
That is, b t+1 is undersupplied to i at t .
Finally, we are ready to derive a contradiction if (1) does not hold.
For notational simplicity, let P = φ( T ) and P = P S( T ).
Define
and
Suppose (1) does not hold. Then there exists some k ∈ N such that φ k,a s ( ) < P S k,a s ( ). As P S k,a s ( ) > 0, k ∈ N s (a s ), i.e., a s is undersupplied to k at . Our objective is to show that i∈N * a∈A p i,a > |N * |, which is a contradiction because i∈N * a∈A p i,a ≤ |N * | by the definition of a random assignment.
Step 1. We show for all
Claim 8 implies that b T is undersupplied to all agents in N s (b T ), which in turn implies by Claim 7 that
Step 6.
This completes the proof.
We finally consider a special case of our model that assumes the existence of the null object (i.e., an object that is always abundant in supply) and provide an interesting corollary of Theorem 2 for this case.
The null object represents an agent's outside option depending on the specific context, i.e., the option of not being assigned a real object from A. This special case of the model could be of important practical relevance since it gives rise to some natural preference misrepresentations that may arise in practice.
For example, in many real-world assignment procedures, authorities often cap the number of objects that agents can include in their preference lists. 18 Even without caps, it could be unrealistic and impractical to expect agents to evaluate and list all of their acceptable objects, especially when the assignment problem involves a large number of objects.
19 Given that agents may need to shorten their preference lists, truncated lists would be among the most natural and likely preference reports to observe in practice. The resulting assignment is potentially volatile depending on whether agents truncate their lists or not, which would be unfavorable for authorities, and potentially for agents as well. Hence, robustness against truncations is a desirable property of a mechanism. This property is implied by weak invariance. As it turns out, for individually rational mechanisms the converse is also true. We introduce formally these next.
Let us denote the null object by ∅. A preference relation i is called a truncation (Roth and Rothblum, 1999) . That is, truncation i is obtained from i by shrinking the list of acceptable objects while preserving the relative rankings of those objects that remain acceptable. The following axiom asks that the probability with which an agent i receives a (real) object a stays the same whenever his preferences are truncated, provided that a remains acceptable after the truncation.
Definition 3. A mechanism φ is weakly truncation robust if for all ∈ P N , i ∈ N , and a ∈ A, φ i,a ( ) = φ i,a ( i , −i ) whenever a i ∅ and i is a truncation of i .
20
Definition 4. A mechanism φ is individually rational if for all ∈ P N , i ∈ N , and a ∈ A, φ i,a ( ) = 0 Pathak, and Roth, 2005) . It is possible that hundreds of programs are acceptable to some students, but it is highly unlikely that they list all of their acceptable schools. In fact, Boston Public Schools encourage families to list at least five school choices ("more is better") when registering (http://www.bostonpublicschools.org/node/169). Also, San Francisco
Unified School District warns in boldface that "[p]arents who do not list up to 7 choices run a higher risk of getting assigned to a school they did not request" (http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=policy.placement.process).
This suggests that some families may not list the maximum number of choices even when that number is small. Even though some of them might actually have a smaller number of acceptable schools than the maximum, still others might shorten their preference lists owing to a host of other reasons including various costs involved in the application process. All the web pages were retrieved on November 15, 2010. 20 In the context of deterministic assignments, Ehlers and Klaus (2009) propose an axiom called truncation invariance.
It requires all agents' assignments to remain the same as a result of agent i's truncation, so long as the object that agent i obtains before the truncation remains acceptable. Truncation invariance would appear stronger than weak truncation robustness: The former imposes the invariance restriction for all objects, whereas the latter only for a particular one. They are, in fact, incomparable because the former restricts the class of truncations but the latter does not.
whenever ∅ i a .
By definition, if i is a truncation of i and a i ∅, then the rankings of the two preferences coincide down to a. Therefore, weak invariance immediately implies weak truncation robustness. The converse statement is also true for individually rational mechanisms.
21
Proposition 1. Suppose that the null object exists. A mechanism is weakly truncation robust if it is weakly invariant. The converse is true if the mechanism is individually rational.
Proof of Proposition 1. To see the first part, note that if i is a truncation of i and a i ∅, then U ( i , a) = U ( i , a) and i | U ( i ,a) = i | U ( i ,a) . To show the second, suppose that a mechanism φ satisfies individual rationality and weak truncation robustness. Fix a ∈ A, i ∈ N , and ∈ P N . Let i be an arbitrary preference such that U ( i , a) = U ( i , a) and i | U ( i ,a) = i | U ( i ,a) . If ∅ i a (and thus 
It follows from Proposition 1 that weak truncation robustness can replace weak invariance in Theorem 2 if the null object is present.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the null object exists. A mechanism is sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weakly truncation robust if and only if it is PS.
22

Concluding Remarks
Finally, we establish the logical independence of the axioms in Theorems 1 and 2. We start with Theorem 1. An ordinally fair but wasteful mechanism is the following. When the total quota of objects exceeds the number of agents, 23 consider the following: Fix q a ≤ q a for all a ∈ A such that a∈A q a = |N |. The PS mechanism that assigns objects according to the artificial quota vector (q a ) a∈A is ordinally fair but 21 The following is an example of a mechanism that is weakly truncation robust but not weakly invariant. For any ∈ P N , let φ( ) = P if there exist two distinct i, j ∈ N such that i = j and ∅ i a for all a ∈ A; and φ( ) = P otherwise, where P and P are two arbitrary but distinct random assignments. 22 As in HH's Theorem 2, by slightly modifying the proof, we can weaken sd-envy-freeness to the following condition:
a i∅ φ i,a ( ) ≥ a i∅ φ j,a ( ) for all ∈ P N and i, j ∈ N . 23 If the total quota of objects is equal to the number of agents, we have an assignment problem with perfect supply. Thus, non-wastefulness holds vacuously.
wasteful. On the other hand, a simple (deterministic) serial dictatorship is a non-wasteful but ordinally unfair mechanism.
The independence of the axioms in Theorem 2 can be shown as follows. The PS mechanism with an artificial quota vector defined above is sd-envy-free and weakly invariant but sd-inefficient. A serial dictatorship is an sd-efficient and weakly invariant mechanism that induces sd-envy. The mechanism in Example 2 is sd-efficient and sd-envy-free, but not weakly invariant.
Example 2. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c}, and q a = q b = q c = 1. Define preference profile * = ((abc), (abc), (bca)). Let mechanism φ be such that
